920 F.2d 619
                 UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee
                     Roy W. COLLINS, Defendant-Appellant.
                                 No. 90-6077.
                        United States Court of Appeals,
                                Tenth Circuit.
                                Nov. 27, 1990.

	Robert G. McCampbell, Asst. U.S. Atty., (Timothy D. Leonard,
U.S. Atty., with him on the brief), Oklahoma City, Okl., for
	Susan M. Otto, Asst. Federal Public Defender, Oklahoma City, Okl.,
for defendant-appellant.

	Before SEYMOUR, BALDOCK and BRORBY, Circuit Judges.

	BALDOCK, Circuit Judge.
	Defendant-appellant Roy Collins was convicted by a jury on three
counts of federal income tax evasion, 26 U.S.C. s 7201.  He now appeals
arguing that the district court improperly instructed the jury on the
issue of good faith and violated his sixth amendment right to counsel by
revoking the pro hac vice admission of his privately retained attorney.
Our jurisdiction over this direct criminal appeal arises under 28 U.S.C. s
1291.  We affirm.
I. Good Faith.
	Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
government, United States v. Spedalieri, 910 F.2d 707, 708 (10th
Cir.1990), we summarize the facts as follows.  Defendant, a
fifty-seven-year-old aircraft structural designer, filed federal income
tax returns and paid taxes from the time he began working until 1979.  At
that time, defendant claims to have become convinced that he was not
obligated to pay taxes.  Defendant purportedly believed that labor
constitutes property which, when exchanged for wages, produces no net gain
subject to taxation as "income."  At other times, defendant claimed that
he was not a "person" under the Internal Revenue Code and argued he was
not subject to taxation because he had not entered into a regulatory
relationship with the United States.  Defendant acknowledged that he
developed these views after attending several meetings with like-minded
individuals, but denied being a tax protester.  Defendant testified that
he "disagreed with the philosophy" of the IRS concerning what constituted
income, rec. vol. V at 186, and felt that he was not obligated to pay
taxes until he received a satisfactory explanation from the IRS concerning
his legal beliefs, id. at 233.
	While employed at CDI Corp. between 1982 and 1984, defendant
stated on his W-4 forms that he had not owed any taxes in the previous
year and did not expect to owe any taxes in the present year.
Consequently, although he was not eligible to claim exempt status, none of
defendant's wages were withheld between 1982 and 1984, with one
exception. [FN1]  Defendant earned taxable income of $48,271 in 1982,
$35,359 in 1983 and $49,080 in 1984;  his estimated tax liability for
those years was $17,862, $10,170 and $15,784 respectively. Between 1982
and 1984, defendant failed to file a tax return and paid no federal income

	FN1. In 1983, the government withheld from defendant's wages a
$525 penalty and $201 in taxes.  Rec. vol. IV at 61-62.

	At the close of trial, the district court instructed the jury on
defendant's good faith defense:
Instruction No. 26
	[B]oth the offenses charged in the indictment and the lesser
included offenses require proof of the accused's willfulness as an
essential element....  If the accused's actions or failure to act was the
result of a good faith misunderstanding as the requirements of the law,
then the actions or failure to act were not "willful."
	An accused's disagreement with the law or his own belief the law
should be held to be unconstitutional--no matter how earnestly he holds
those beliefs--is not a good faith misunderstanding of the law.  On the
other hand, the accused may hold beliefs concerning his duties under the
law which, although not reasonable, are held in good faith.  Such a good
faith belief is a defense to the charges in the indictment as well as
lesser included offenses.
	[I]f the defendant held a good faith belief that the law did not
apply to him, he would not have acted willfully as he is charged.  This is
so whether or not the defendant's belief was reasonable.  However, if you
regard his belief as being highly unreasonable, you may consider this
along with all other evidence on the question of whether his belief was
indeed genuine or merely feigned or made-up.... Rec. vol. I, doc. 99
(emphasis in original).  Defendant argues that this instruction confused
the jury by improperly focusing its inquiry on the objective
reasonableness of defendant's belief instead of whether such belief was
genuine.  We review jury instructions as a whole to determine whether the
instruction in question accurately stated the governing law and provided
the jury with an ample understanding of the applicable issues and legal
standards.  United States v. Bedonie, 913 F.2d 782, 791 (10th Cir.1990).
	A good faith misunderstanding of the duty to pay income taxes can
negate the willfulness element of tax evasion charge, "and '[t]he
misunderstanding need not have a reasonable basis to provide a defense.' "
United States v. Harting, 879 F.2d 765, 767 (10th Cir.1989) (quoting
United States v. Hairston, 819 F.2d 971, 972 (10th Cir.1987));  but see
United States v. Cheek, 882 F.2d 1263, 1270 (7th Cir.1989) (rejecting
subjective reasonableness standard followed by other circuits in favor of
objective reasonableness standard), vacated --- U.S. ----, 111 S.Ct. 604,
--- L.Ed.2d ---- (1991).  However, "although not itself the standard by
which to evaluate good faith, the reasonableness of a good-faith defense
is a factor which the jury may properly consider in determining whether a
defendant's asserted beliefs are genuinely held."  United States v. Mann,
884 F.2d 532, 537 n. 3 (10th Cir.1989).  In the instant case, the district
court explained to the jury that, although defendant's subjective belief
that he was not obligated to pay taxes did not have to be reasonable to
effectuate a valid good faith defense, the objective reasonableness of
defendant's belief could be considered, along with other evidence, in
determining whether his subjective belief was genuine.  We find the
court's instruction unambiguous and fully consistent with our holdings in
Mann and Harting.
II. Right to Counsel.
	Attorney Jeffrey A. Dickstein made his first appearance on
defendant's behalf on April 17, 1989 after being admitted pro hac vice by
the district court. [FN2]  Defendant apparently retained Dickstein because
counsel agreed with defendant's views on the invalidity of federal income
tax laws.  Rec. vol. IV at 15.  Dickstein's obstreperous attitude was
first illustrated by his entry of appearance which informed the court that
his association with local counsel in compliance with local rules was
"under duress."  Rec. vol. I, doc. 17.  On May 1, 1989, Dickstein filed
ten pretrial motions.  The first filing was an 84-page motion to dismiss,
lavishly larded with citations to the Declaration of Independence,
colonial history and a plethora of nineteenth century Supreme Court cases.
Rec. vol. IX, doc. 21.  Dickstein argued that federal criminal
jurisdiction only encompasses acts committed within the District of
Columbia, on the high seas or on federal property;  consequently the
district court lacked jurisdiction over defendant. [FN3]  Id. at 15, 80.
Dickstein also argued that federal income taxes must be direct and
apportioned to survive constitutional scrutiny.  Id. at 37, 81.  While
acknowledging the "alleged ratification" of the sixteenth amendment,
id. at 48, he insisted that the amendment only authorizes an income tax
within the District of Columbia and the territorial possessions of the
United States.  Id. at 48-49.  Finally, Dickstein questioned whether
defendant was an "individual" subject to taxation under the Internal
Revenue Code. [FN4]

	FN2. Dickstein's reputation preceded him.  Admitted to practice
law in California in 1976, Dickstein currently limits his practice to
matters relating to federal individual income tax.  Dickstein has
practiced pro hac vice throughout the country in often rancorous
proceedings before various federal district courts.  In Donnell v. United
States, No. A84-416 Civil, unpub. order (D.Alaska Jan. 16, 1986), the
district court revoked Dickstein's pro hac vice admission after local
counsel declined to assume responsibility for Dickstein's pleadings.
While defending an individual on federal criminal tax evasion charges in
Washington, Dickstein impugned the integrity of the district court during
trial.  See United States v. Summet, 862 F.2d 784, 785 (9th Cir.1988).
The Ninth Circuit upheld the district court's formal censure of Dickstein
as well as its prospective denial of pro hac vice status.  Id. at 786-87.
Based upon Dickstein's conduct in Summet, the Nevada federal district
court denied his application for admission pro hac vice in Nutter
v. United States, No. CV- 88-17-PMB, unpub. order (D.Nev. Jan. 21, 1988).
Following that court's denial, Dickstein remained in the courtroom and
continued to disrupt the proceedings, disregarding the court's frequent
admonitions that he remain silent.  After repeated outbursts, the district
court was obliged to order Dickstein removed from the courtroom by a
United States marshal.  Id. at 3 n. 3.  In Roat v. Commissioner, 847 F.2d
1379 (9th Cir.1988), Dickstein raised a series of frivolous arguments
challenging the authority of the IRS and the jurisdiction of the Tax
Court.  The Ninth Circuit rejected Dickstein's contentions stating:  "we
publish this opinion in part to warn future appellants that the arguments
we have rejected here have no place in this court."  Id. at 1384.

	FN3. Dickstein explained: The allegation that certain acts were
committed within the Western District of Oklahoma ... is insufficient....
[I]t is incumbent upon the prosecution to prove that Guthrie, Oklahoma has
been ceded to the United States by the State of Oklahoma, and that in the
absence of such a showing, Defendant is entitled to have the indictment
against him dismissed. Rec. vol. IX, doc. 21 at 82.  Dickstein advanced
virtually identical arguments in United States v. Jump, 88-CR-003-E
(N.D.Okla. Mar. 24, 1988) and United States v. Reeves,
No. CR87-00027-01-P(J) (W.D.Ky. Apr 25, 1988).  See rec. vol. X, doc. 51,
ex. J & L.

	FN4. According to Dickstein: Sections 1, 2 and 3 of the 1954
Internal Revenue Code state that the income tax is imposed on the taxable
income of an "individual;"  other than this, there is no other or further
description in the same Code which defines or describes that "individual."
There must be somewhere or someplace a legal description of that
"individual" because otherwise every "individual" in the entire world
would fall within this class.  It is known that "individuals" in other
countries having absolutely no connection with the United States can't
possibly be the "individuals" described in the Code, but the Code itself
contains no such limitation which statutorily excluded "individuals" in
other parts of the world. Rec. vol. IX, doc. 21 at 47.

	Dickstein's second motion to dismiss argued that because the 1040
forms that defendant failed to file were not affixed with expiration
dates, the indictment should be dismissed pursuant to the Paperwork
Reduction Act, 44 U.S.C. ss 3501-20.  Rec. vol. IX, doc. 25.  Dickstein's
third motion sought to strike as surplusage language in the indictment
alleging that defendant failed to file income tax returns or pay income
tax to the IRS.  Rec. vol. IX, doc. 24.  His fourth motion sought to
suppress all evidence obtained by a third-party summons issued by an IRS
special agent.  Rec. vol. IX, doc. 27.
	Dickstein also filed on defendant's behalf a motion in limine
seeking suppression of several items of evidence, including admissions
defendant made to an IRS Special Agent.  Rec. vol. IX, doc 30.  In
addition, he filed a motion for bill of particulars, rec. vol. IX,
doc. 22, a motion for oral voir dire, rec. vol. IX, doc. 28, a motion to
dismiss the indictment for grand jury abuse, rec. vol. IX, doc. 23, a
motion for disclosure for exculpatory evidence pursuant to Brady
v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963),
rec. vol. IX, doc 29, and a motion for Jencks Act material, rec. vol. IX,
doc. 26.
	The district court denied each of defendant's pretrial motions.
Rec. vol. X, doc. 46.  Thereafter, stating that "the defense motions
evince a tactic of obfuscation and waste," the court issued an order to
show cause why Dickstein's pro hac vice admission should not be revoked.
Rec. vol. I, doc. 40 at 1. Dickstein responded with a written motion
reiterating the legal positions advanced in his previous motions and
arguing that the district judge should recuse himself. [FN5]  After
considering Dickstein's motion and the government's response, [FN6] the
district court revoked Dickstein's admission pro hac vice and removed him
from the case.  Rec. vol. I, doc. 52.  The court explained:

	FN5. Dickstein opined: So long as Judge Alley and other federal
judges consider themselves subject to the federal income tax, their belief
system that "if I have to pay so do you" eliminates any possibility of any
Defendant receiving a fair trial. Rec. vol. X, doc. 48 at 8 n. 2.

	FN6. Appended to the government's response to the district court's
show cause order were transcripts and orders reflecting Dickstein's
obstreperous conduct before other federal district courts.  See
rec. vol. X, doc. 51.

	The pleadings filed by Attorney Dickstein in this case signal the
Court that permitting his future participation will obscure the issues,
engulf the case with frivolity, and deflect the proceedings from their
object--the orderly determination whether defendant has broken the law or
not.  Just as a court need not suffer the testimony of a purported expert
witness that the moon is made of green cheese, it need not suffer the
serving-up of legal swill by Attorney Dickstein in this case.  This is so
even if defendant, who recites his approval of Attorney Dickstein's
pleadings, likes the recipe. Id. at 2.  In a supplemental order, the
district court found that Dickstein violated Oklahoma Rules of
Professional Conduct by raising frivolous arguments before the court and
failing to cite contrary authority.  Rec. vol. I, doc. 57 at 6-9.  In
light of those violations, the court held "that the interests in the fair
and proper administration of justice ... outweigh [defendant's] interest
in representation by the counsel of his choice."  Id. at 10. Dickstein
unsuccessfully petitioned this court for a writ of mandamus, Dickstein
v. Collins & Alley, No. 89-6225, unpub. order (10th Cir. Oct. 10, 1989),
whereupon the federal public defender was substituted as defense counsel.
	The sixth amendment guarantees that "[i]n all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall ... have the Assistance of Counsel for his
defense."  U.S. Const. am. VI.  "It is hardly necessary to say that, the
right to counsel being conceded, a defendant should be afforded a fair
opportunity to secure counsel of his own choice."  Powell v. Alabama, 287
U.S. 45, 53, 53 S.Ct. 55, 58, 77 L.Ed. 158 (1932). [FN7]  The right to
retain counsel of choice stems from a defendant's right to decide what
kind of defense he wishes to present. [FN8]  United States v. Nichols, 841
F.2d 1485, 1502 (10th Cir.1988).  "Attorneys are not fungible;"  often
"the most important decision a defendant makes in shaping his defense is
his selection of an attorney."  United States v. Laura, 607 F.2d 52, 56
(3d Cir.1979); Nichols, 841 F.2d at 1502.  When a defendant is financially
able to retain counsel, the choice of counsel rests in his hands, not in
the hands of the state.  United States v. Richardson, 894 F.2d 492, 496
(1st Cir.1990); Wilson v. Mintzes, 761 F.2d 275, 280 (6th Cir.1985).  A
defendant's right to retain counsel of his choice therefore represents "
'a right of constitutional dimension,' " United States v. Cunningham, 672
F.2d 1064, 1070 (2d Cir.1982) (quoting United States v. Wisniewski, 478
F.2d 274, 285 (2d Cir.1973)), the denial of which may rise to the level of
a constitutional violation, Birt v. Montgomery, 725 F.2d 587, 592 (11th
Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 874, 105 S.Ct. 232, 83 L.Ed.2d 161
(1984); Wilson, 761 F.2d at 278-79.  When a court unreasonably or
arbitrarily interferes with an accused right to retain counsel of his
choice, a conviction attained under such circumstances cannot stand,
irrespective of whether the defendant has been prejudiced.  United States
v. Novak, 903 F.2d 883, 886 (2d Cir.1990);  Fuller v. Diesslin, 868 F.2d
604, 606 (3d Cir.1989); United States v. Wheat, 813 F.2d 1399, 1402 (9th
Cir.1987), aff'd, 486 U.S. 153, 108 S.Ct. 1692, 100 L.Ed.2d 140 (1988);
United States v. Panzardi Alvarez, 816 F.2d 813, 818 (1st Cir.1987);
Wilson, 761 F.2d at 281. However, a defendant's right to retain counsel of
his choice is not absolute and "may not 'be insisted upon in a manner that
will obstruct an orderly procedure in courts of justice, and deprive such
courts of the exercise of their inherent powers to control the same.' "
United States v. Gipson, 693 F.2d 109, 111 (10th Cir.1982) (quoting United
States v. Burton, 584 F.2d 485, 489 (D.C.Cir.1978), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 1069, 99 S.Ct. 837, 59 L.Ed.2d 34 (1979)), cert. denied, 459
U.S. 1216, 103 S.Ct. 1218, 75 L.Ed.2d 455 (1983);  United States
v. Freeman, 816 F.2d 558, 564 (10th Cir.1987).

	FN7. See also Chandler v. Fretag, 348 U.S. 3, 10, 75 S.Ct. 1, 5,
99 L.Ed. 4 (1954) ("a defendant must be given a reasonable opportunity to
employ and consult with counsel;  otherwise the right to be heard by
counsel would be of little worth");  Glasser v. United States, 315
U.S. 60, 75, 62 S.Ct. 457, 467, 86 L.Ed. 680 (1942) ("[defendant] wished
the benefit of the undivided assistance of counsel of his own choice.  We
think that such a desire on the part of an accused should be respected.").

	FN8. A defendant's right to secure counsel of his choice is
cognizable only insofar as defendant is able to retain counsel with
private funds.  An indigent defendant must be provided with counsel at
state expense, Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 343-44, 83 S.Ct. 792,
796-97, 9 L.Ed.2d 799 (1963), and appointed counsel are held to the same
standard of competence as retained counsel, United States v. Gipson, 693
F.2d 109, 111 n. 1 (10th Cir.1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1216, 103
S.Ct. 1218, 75 L.Ed.2d 455 (1983).  However, "an indigent defendant does
not have a right to choose appointed counsel."  United States v. Nichols,
841 F.2d 1485 (10th Cir.1988).

	[W]hile the right to select and be represented by one's preferred
attorney is comprehended by the Sixth Amendment, the essential aim of the
Amendment is to guarantee an effective advocate for each criminal
defendant rather than to ensure that a defendant will inexorably be
represented by the lawyer whom he prefers. Wheat v. United States, 486
U.S. 153, 159, 108 S.Ct. 1692, 1697, 100 L.Ed.2d 140 (1988);  see Morris
v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 13-14, 103 S.Ct. 1610, 1617-18, 75 L.Ed.2d 610
(1983) (no sixth amendment right to "meaningful" attorney-client
relationship);  United States v. Weninger, 624 F.2d 163, 166 (10th Cir.)
(no sixth amendment right to counsel who agree with defendants, views on
the invalidity of the tax laws), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1012, 101
S.Ct. 568, 66 L.Ed.2d 470 (1980);  Richardson, 894 F.2d at 498 (court may
refuse to allow defendant to substitute counsel on the morning of trial);
Panzardi Alvarez, 816 F.2d at 816 (defendants' right to retain counsel of
his choice "cannot be manipulated to delay proceedings or hamper the
prosecution").  A defendant's choice of retained counsel must be respected
"unless it would unreasonably delay proceedings or burden the court with
retained counsel who was incompetent or unwilling to abide by court rules
and ethical guidelines".  Panzardi Alvarez, 816 F.2d at 818.  It "should
be deprived only where such drastic action is necessary to further some
overriding social or ethical interest".  United States Hobson, 672 F.2d
825, 828 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 906, 103 S.Ct. 208, 74
L.Ed.2d 166 (1982). Courts therefore must balance a defendant's
constitutional right to retain counsel of his choice against the need to
maintain the highest standards of professional responsibility, the
public's confidence in the integrity of the judicial process and the
orderly administration of justice.  Nichols, 841 F.2d at 1503;  Weninger,
624 F.2d at 166;  Fuller, 868 F.2d at 607; Wheat, 813 F.2d at 1402;
Panzardi Alvarez, 816 F.2d at 816;  Wilson, 761 F.2d at 280;  Cunningham,
672 F.2d at 1070.
	Before reaching the merits of defendant's sixth amendment claim,
we address the effect of Dickstein's pro hac vice admission.  Although the
admission of attorneys pro hac vice is committed to the discretion of the
district courts, denial of admission pro hac vice in criminal cases
implicates the constitutional right to counsel of choice. [FN9]
Panzardi-Alvarez v. United States, 879 F.2d 975, 980 (1st Cir.1989),
cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 110 S.Ct. 1140, 107 L.Ed.2d 1045 (1990);
Fuller, 868 F.2d at 607;  Panzardi Alvarez, 816 F.2d at 816.  A district
court may deny admission pro hac vice to a defendant's counsel of choice
when that attorney is unable to provide the defendant with competent
representation.  See, e.g., United States v. Campbell, 874 F.2d 838,
848-49 (1st Cir.1989) (counsel had not been in a courtroom for over
twenty-five years and lacked knowledge of defendant's case).  Courts also
may consider an attorney's ethical fitness before granting a motion to
proceed pro hac vice.  Panzardi-Alvarez, 879 F.2d at 980 (denial of pro
hac vice status appropriate where attorney previously violated
Fed.R.Crim.P. 44(c) and harassed judge outside chambers), cert. denied,
--- U.S. ----, 110 S.Ct. 1140, 107 L.Ed.2d 1045 (1990); Thomas v. Cassidy,
249 F.2d 91, 92 (4th Cir.1957) (denial of pro hac vice admission based
upon "unlawyerlike conduct" justifiable), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 958, 78
S.Ct. 544, 2 L.Ed.2d 533 (1958).  However, district courts must articulate
reasonable grounds for denying pro hac vice admission to defendant's
chosen counsel;  mechanistic application of rules limiting such
appearances is improper.  Fuller, 868 F.2d at 611;  see Panzardi Alvarez,
816 F.2d at 817 (simple numerical limitation of pro hac vice appearances
violated defendant's right to retain counsel of choice where there was no
record that allowing such admissions would have inhibited the fair and
orderly administration of justice).

	FN9. The Supreme Court has rejected attorneys' claims that a
state's denial of admission pro hac vice violates their rights under the
Privilege and Immunities Clauses and the fourteenth amendment.  See
Supreme Court of New Hampshire v. Piper, 470 U.S. 274, 105 S.Ct. 1272, 84
L.Ed.2d 205 (1985);  Leis v. Flynt, 439 U.S. 438, 99 S.Ct. 698, 58 L.Ed.2d
717 (1979).  The Court has not addressed, however, whether such a denial
violates defendants' rights under the sixth amendment.  See Leis, 439
U.S. at 442 n. 4, 99 S.Ct. at 701 n. 4;  Fuller v. Diesslin, 868 F.2d 604,
607 (3d Cir.1989).

	Attorneys admitted pro hac vice are held to the same professional
responsibilities and ethical standards as regular counsel.  Once admitted,
pro hac vice counsel cannot be disqualified under standards and procedures
any different or more stringent than those imposed upon regular members of
the district court bar.  Kirkland v. National Mortgage Network, 884 F.2d
1367, 1371 (11th Cir.1981);  Kohler v. Richardson-Merrell, 737 F.2d 1038,
1054 (D.C.Cir.1984).  Although district courts need not conduct a
full-scale hearing every time an attorney's pro hac vice admission is
revoked, counsel must be provided with notice and an opportunity to
respond.  Johnson v. Trueblood, 629 F.2d 302, 303 (3d Cir.1980);  United
States v. Cooper, 675 F.Supp. 753, 758 (D.R.I.1987).
	Here, the district court satisfied defendant's [FN10] right to
procedural due process by providing notice and an opportunity to show
cause why his counsel's admission pro hac vice should not be revoked.
However, the district court indicated that Dickstein could be removed from
the case more readily than a regular member of the bar. [FN11]
Dickstein's conduct before the district court was subject to the same
standard of professionalism as regular bar members.  His behavior before
other courts provided ample grounds to scrutinize his application for pro
hac vice admission.  However, because the district court in exercise of
its discretion admitted Dickstein pro hac vice, the court's subsequent
revocation of such status must be evaluated as though it had disqualified
a regular member of the Western District of Oklahoma bar.

	FN10. Defendant argues that, in revoking Dickstein's pro hac vice
status, the district court failed to follow W.D.Okla.R. 4(J) governing
attorney disciplinary procedures.  We need not address this argument
because defendant lacks standing to argue that Dickstein's rights to
procedural due process were violated.

	FN11. The district court stated: The relationship between a court
and a regular member of its own bar is in part defined by the system of
discipline applied within that bar.  An attorney pro hac vice is more a
stranger to the court, subject to discipline but not in the same way or in
the same extent as a regular member of the court's bar.  This is why
discretion is afforded over pro hac vice admission, notwithstanding the
recognized preference to permit a defendant to be represented by counsel
of his choice. Rec. vol. I, doc 52 at 1-2.

	"Federal Courts have an independent interest in ensuring that
criminal trials are conducted within the ethical standards of the
profession and that legal proceedings appear fair to all who observe
them."  Wheat, 486 U.S. at 160, 108 S.Ct. at 1697.  When a district court
finds that counsel has a conflict of interest, real or potential, it
retains "substantial latitude" to disqualify counsel, even where a
defendant consents to representation.  Id. at 163, 108 S.Ct. at 1697-98.
Moreover, an attorney may be dismissed for pursuing frivolous theories,
even if he acts on the behest of the defendant. See United States
v. Masat, 896 F.2d 88, 92 (5th Cir.1990).  Violation of accepted rules of
professional conduct which result in the "erosion of public confidence in
the integrity of the bar and of the legal system" also may justify
disqualification of defendant's chosen counsel.  Hobson, 672 F.2d at 828;
see, e.g., United States v. Walton, 703 F.Supp. 75, 77 (S.D.Fla.1988)
(disqualification of defense attorney warranted on strength of
codefendant's allegation that attorney was prepared to use false
testimony). However, acts which appear to violate the ABA Code or other
accepted standards of legal ethics do not confer upon the trial court
unfettered discretion to disqualify the attorney selected by a party....
An attorney may be disqualified only when there is "a reasonable
possibility that some specifically identifiable impropriety" actually
occurred and, in light of the interest underlying the standards of ethics,
the social need for ethical practice outweighs the party's right to
counsel of his choice. Kitchin, 592 F.2d at 903 (quoting Woods
v. Clovington County Bank, 537 F.2d 804 (5th Cir.1976));  United States
v. Castellano, 610 F.Supp. 1137, 1147 (S.D.N.Y.1985).  Finally, an
attorney's misconduct in open court may sufficiently impede the orderly
administration of justice to supersede a defendant's sixth amendment right
to retain counsel of his choice.  See United States v. Dinitz, 538 F.2d
1214, 1220-21 (5th Cir.1976) (en banc) (counsel expelled from courtroom
after he ignored the court's instructions not to interject personal
opinion into his opening statement and advanced factual allegations
lacking evidentiary foundation;  no sixth amendment violation); Ross
v. Reda, 510 F.2d 1172, 1173 (6th Cir.) (denial of attorney's request to
proceed pro hac vice did not violate defendant's right to counsel of
choice where attorney refused to limit out-of-court statements about the
case), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 892, 96 S.Ct. 190, 46 L.Ed.2d 124 (1975).
	When a district court disqualifies defendant's counsel of choice,
it must make findings on the record stating the rationale for its
action. Laura, 607 F.2d at 60.  The appropriate standard of review for
attorney disqualification depends upon the nature and timing of the
district court's determination.  A court's factual findings concerning the
disqualification of an attorney, particularly findings concerning
counsel's motivation and state of mind, are reviewed for clear error.
Nationalist Movement v. City of Cumming, 913 F.2d 885, 895 (11th
Cir.1990).  When the offending conduct takes place in open court, the
district court must make an immediate decision whether the attorney's
continued participation in the case will jeopardize the integrity of the
proceeding.  A disqualification decision rendered under such circumstances
is "so closely linked to the trial judge's responsibility to supervise the
conduct of the case before him" that it is "properly reviewed under the
abuse of discretion standard."  Norton v. Tallahassee Memorial Hospital,
700 F.2d 617, 619 (11th Cir.1983);  see, e.g., City of Cumming, 913 F.2d
at 895 (revocation of pro hac vice admission for courtroom misconduct
reviewed for abuse of discretion);  Dinitz, 538 F.2d at 1219
(disqualification of defense counsel for making inappropriate remarks to
jury reviewed for abuse of discretion).  However, " 'in disqualification
cases ... where the facts are not in dispute, District Courts enjoy no
particular functional advantage over appellate courts in their formulation
and application of ethical norms.' "  United States v. Snyder, 707 F.2d
139, 144 (5th Cir.1983) (quoting Woods, 537 F.2d at 810);  City of
Cumming, 913 F.2d at 895;  see United States v. Hughes, 817 F.2d 268, 270
n. 1 (5th Cir.) (disqualification of defense counsel for conflict of
interest reviewed for simple error), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 858, 108
S.Ct. 170, 98 L.Ed.2d 124 (1987);  Novo Terapeutisk v. Baxter Travenol
Laboratories, 607 F.2d 186, 198 (7th Cir.1979) (same);  United States
v. Miller, 624 F.2d 1198, 1201 (3d Cir.1980) (determination of whether
attorney's conduct violated ABA disciplinary rule " 'leaves little leeway
for the exercise of discretion.' ") (quoting American Roller
Co. v. Budinger, 513 F.2d 982, 985 n. 3 (3d Cir.1975));  but see Gilbert
v. City of Little Rock, 622 F.2d 386, 397 (8th Cir.1980) (disqualification
of attorneys for violation of Code of Professional Responsibility reviewed
for abuse of discretion).  Moreover, in cases implicating a criminal
defendant's sixth amendment right to counsel " 'the abuse of discretion
standard is simply too deferential where such a fundamental constitutional
right is affected.' "  Snyder, 707 F.2d at 144 (quoting Hobson, 672 F.2d
at 827);  City of Cumming, 913 F.2d at 895 (where disqualification raises
sixth amendment questions, district court's decision "subject to careful
examination by the appellate court.");  but see United States v. DeFazio,
899 F.2d 626, 629 (7th Cir.1990) (abuse of discretion standard governs
review of defense attorney disqualification).
	Here, the district court found that Dickstein's conduct violated
Rules 3.1 and 3.3 of the Oklahoma Rules of Professional Conduct and
concluded that defendant's sixth amendment right to retain counsel of his
choice was outweighed by the public's interest in the fair and orderly
administration of justice.  The court did not arrive at these conclusions
based upon Dickstein's conduct in open court;  it disqualified Dickstein
on the basis of his pleadings.  In analyzing these pleadings against
applicable ethical and constitutional standards, the district court
enjoyed no functional advantage which would militate against plenary
review.  We therefore review de novo the district court's revocation of
Dickstein's admission pro hac vice and his resulting disqualification from
further participation in the case.
	Although all ten of the pretrial motions Dickstein filed in the
instant case were denied, such denial does not necessarily render those
motions frivolous. Many of Dickstein's motions were entirely routine and
appropriate, e.g., the discovery motions, the motion for a bill of
particulars and the portion of the suppression motion that sought
exclusion of defendant's statements to the IRS.  However, merely because
several of Dickstein's motions fell within the bounds of acceptable
advocacy does not salvage those motions that entirely departed from that
standard.  We therefore consider Dickstein's motion to dismiss for lack of
jurisdiction, his motion to dismiss for violation of the Paperwork
Reduction Act, his motion to strike and to suppress results of the third
party summons.
	1. Jurisdiction
	Dickstein's motion to dismiss advanced the hackneyed tax protester
refrain that federal criminal jurisdiction only extends to the District of
Columbia, United States territorial possessions and ceded territories.
Dickstein's memorandum blithely ignored 18 U.S.C. s 3231 which explicitly
vests federal district courts with jurisdiction over "all offenses against
the laws of the United States."  Dickstein also conveniently ignored
article I, section 8 of the United States Constitution which empowers
Congress to create, define and punish crimes, irrespective of where they
are committed.  See United States v. Worrall, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 384, 393, 1
L.Ed. 426 (1798) (Chase, J.).  Article I, section 8 and the sixteenth
amendment also empowers Congress to create and provide for the
administration of an income tax;  the statute under which defendant was
charged and convicted, 26 U.S.C. s 7201, plainly falls within that
authority.  Efforts to argue that federal jurisdiction does not encompass
prosecutions for federal tax evasion have been rejected as either "silly"
or "frivolous" by a myriad of courts throughout the nation.  See, e.g.,
United States v. Dawes, 874 F.2d 746, 750 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, ---
U.S. ----, 110 S.Ct. 284, 107 L.Ed.2d 264 (1989), overruled on other
grounds, 895 F.2d 1581 (10th Cir.1990);  United States v. Tedder, 787 F.2d
540, 542 (10th Cir.1986);  United States v. Amon, 669 F.2d 1351, 1355
(10th Cir.1981); United States v. Brown, 600 F.2d 248, 259 (10th Cir.),
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 917, 100 S.Ct. 233, 62 L.Ed.2d 172 (1979);  Cheek,
882 F.2d at 1270; United States v. Ward, 833 F.2d 1538, 1539 (11th
Cir.1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 1022, 108 S.Ct. 1576, 99 L.Ed.2d 891
(1988);  United States v. Koliboski, 732 F.2d 1328, 1329-30 (7th
Cir.1984);  United States v. Evans, 717 F.2d 1334, 1334 (11th Cir.1983);
United States v. Drefke, 707 F.2d 978, 981 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 464
U.S. 942, 104 S.Ct. 359, 78 L.Ed.2d 321 (1983);  United States
v. Spurgeon, 671 F.2d 1198, 1199 (8th Cir.1982); O'Brien v. United States,
51 F.2d 193, 196 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 284 U.S. 673, 52 S.Ct. 129, 76
L.Ed. 569 (1931).  In the face of this uniform authority, it defies
credulity to argue that the district court lacked jurisdiction to
adjudicate the government's case against defendant.
	Dickstein's argument that the sixteenth amendment does not
authorize a direct, non-apportioned tax on United States citizens
similarly is devoid of any arguable basis in law.  Indeed, the Ninth
Circuit recently noted "the patent absurdity and frivolity of such a
proposition."  In re Becraft, 885 F.2d 547, 548 (9th Cir.1989).  For
seventy-five years, the Supreme Court has recognized that the sixteenth
amendment authorizes a direct nonapportioned tax upon United States
citizens throughout the nation, not just in federal enclaves, see
Brushaber v. Union Pac. R.R., 240 U.S. 1, 12-19, 36 S.Ct. 236, 239-42, 60
L.Ed. 493 (1916);  efforts to argue otherwise have been sanctioned as
frivolous, see, e.g., Becraft, 885 F.2d at 549 (Fed.R.App.P. 38 sanctions
for raising frivolous sixteenth amendment argument in petition for
rehearing);  Lovell v. United States, 755 F.2d 517, 519-20 (7th Cir.1984)
(Fed.R.App.P. 38 sanctions imposed on pro se litigants raising frivolous
sixteenth amendment contentions).  Dickstein's contention that defendant
was not an "individual" under the Internal Revenue Code also is frivolous.
See Dawes, 874 F.2d at 750-51;  United States v. Studley, 783 F.2d 934,
937 (9th Cir.1986);  United States v. Rice, 659 F.2d 524, 528 (5th
Cir. Unit A 1981).  And his disregard of governing legal precedent is
further portrayed by his reference to the "alleged ratification" of the
sixteenth amendment in the face of uniform contrary authority.  See, e.g.,
Miller v. United States, 868 F.2d 236, 241 (7th Cir.1989);  United States
v. Sitka, 845 F.2d 43, 46-47 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 827, 109
S.Ct. 77, 102 L.Ed.2d 54 (1988);  United States v. Stahl, 792 F.2d 1438,
1440-41 (9th Cir.1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1036, 107 S.Ct. 888, 93
L.Ed.2d 840 (1987);  Sisk v. Commissioner, 791 F.2d 58, 60-61 (6th
Cir.1986);  see generally United States v. Stillhammer, 706 F.2d 1072,
1077-78 (10th Cir.1983).  Argument reflecting such contemptuous disregard
for established legal authority has no place within this circuit.
	2. Paperwork Reduction Act
	The Paperwork Reduction Act, 44 U.S.C. ss 3501-20, requires that
federal agencies submit all "information collection requests" to the
Director of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) for review, 44
U.S.C. s 3507. "Typical information collection requests include tax forms,
[FN12] medicare forms, financial loan applications, job applications,
questionnaires, compliance reports and tax or business records."  Dole
v. United Steelworkers, --- U.S. ----, 110 S.Ct. 929, 933, 108 L.Ed.2d 23
(1990).  Once the OMB director approves the information collection
requests, he must assign it a control number.  44 U.S.C. s 3504.  An
agency shall not conduct or sponsor the collection of information unless
the information collection request has been submitted to and approved by
the Director, 44 U.S.C. s 3507(a), and shall not engage in a collection of
information without obtaining from the Director a control number to be
displayed upon the information collection request, 44 U.S.C. s 3507(f).

	FN12. In United States v. Tedder, 787 F.2d 540, 542 (10th
Cir.1986), this court held that tax forms were not information collection
requests subject to the Paperwork Reduction Act because the filing of
income tax returns was obligatory.  This holding is superseded by the
Supreme Court's analysis in Dole v. United Steelworkers, --- U.S. ----,
110 S.Ct. 929, 933, 108 L.Ed.2d 23 (1990), which included federal income
tax forms within the category of information collection requests under the
Act.  Dole would also appear to call into question the holdings in Snyder
v. IRS, 596 F.Supp. 240 (N.D.Ind.1984) and Cameron v. IRS, 593
F.Supp. 1540 (N.D.Ind.1984), aff'd, 773 F.2d 126 (7th Cir.1985), both of
which held the Paperwork Reduction Act inapplicable to IRS forms.
However, Dole does not contravene our recent holding in Lonsdale v. United
States, 919 F.2d 1440, 1444 (10th Cir.1990) that IRS summonses do not
constitute information requests under the Act because they are issued in
the course of an investigation directed against a specific individual or
entity.  See 44 U.S.C. s 3518(c)(1)(B)(ii).

	no person shall be subject to any penalty for failing to maintain
or provide information to any agency if the information collection request
involved was made after December 31, 1981, and does not display a current
control number assigned by the Director, or fails to state that such
request is not subject to this chapter. 44 U.S.C. s 3512.  See, e.g.,
United States v. Smith, 866 F.2d 1092, 1098-99 (9th Cir.1989) (prosecution
for failure to file a Plan of Operations with the Forest Service barred
under s 3512 of the Act because the filing requirement was imposed
pursuant to an information collection request which lacked an OMB control
	Dickstein did not contend that the W-4 forms at issue in the case
violated the Paperwork Reduction Act.  He further conceded that the IRS
1040 forms at issue all contained OMB control numbers. [FN13]  He argued,
however, that because the forms did not contain expiration dates, they did
not comply with the Act.  While acknowledging that there is no explicit
requirement in the statute that information collection requests contain
expiration dates, Dickstein pointed to oblique language in the legislative
history of the Act suggesting that expiration dates are required.  See
S.Rep. No. 96-930, 96th Cong. 2d Sess. (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.Code
Cong. & Admin.News 6241, 6242.  We agree with the district court that this
isolated language in the Senate Report does not outweigh plain statutory
language indicating that expiration dates are not required along with an
OMB control number.  However we cannot say that Dickstein lacked an
arguable legal basis to argue to the contrary.  See Lonsdale v. United
States, 919 F.2d 1440, 1447 (10th Cir.1990) (coverage of Paperwork
Reduction Act is not sufficiently well-settled to warrant sanctions for
frivolous appeal).  On the other hand, the IRS 1040 forms at issue in the
present case were explicitly designated as either "1982," "1983," or
"1984" tax returns with their effective dates of coverage clearly
denoted. [FN14]  See rec. vol. IX, doc. 25.  Assuming, arguendo, that the
Paperwork Reduction Act mandates that all federal forms contain expiration
dates, this requirement plainly would be satisfied by the dates provided
on the 1040 forms at issue.  Dickstein thus lacked any arguable basis in
fact or law to argue that the noncompliance of the 1040 forms which
defendant failed to file did not comply with the Paperwork Reduction Act:
his argument is legally frivolous.  See Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319,
109 S.Ct. 1827, 1831, 104 L.Ed.2d 338 (1989) (defining legal

	FN13. In United States v. Weiss, 914 F.2d 1514, 1520-22 (2d
Cir.1990), the Second Circuit held that the Paperwork Reduction Act did
not preclude prosecution for filing false medicare and Medicaid claims,
despite the fact that the forms in question did not contain OMB control
numbers. Distinguishing Smith, where defendants were prosecuted for
failure to file a Plan of Operations with the Forest Service, the Second
Circuit reasoned that the Act " 'only protects a person from penalties for
failing to file information.  It does not protect one who files
information which is false.' "  Id. at 1522 (quoting Funk, The Paperwork
Reduction Act: Paperwork Reduction Meets Administrative Law, 24 Harv.J. on
Legis. 1, 77 n. 411 (1987)) (emphasis in original).  We recognize that
because defendant was charged with tax evasion and not failure to file tax
returns, he technically was not being prosecuted for failure to provide
information. Had defendant's tax evasion been effectuated through the
filing of falsified tax returns, Weiss would dictate that no Paperwork
Reduction Defense would be available to him.  But because the provision of
information in 1040 forms is inexorably linked to the statutory
requirement to pay taxes, and defendant failed to file such forms, the
Paperwork Reduction Act was applicable to such conduct.

	FN14. For example, the 1982 1040 form submitted in support of
Dickstein's motion to dismiss read: "1040 U.S. Individual Income Tax
Return 1982 For the year January 1- December 31, 1982 or other year
beginning _________, 1982, ending _________, 19__."  See rec. vol. IX,
doc. 25.  The 1983 and 1984 1040 forms followed the same format.

	3. Motion to Strike
	Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 7(d) empowers district courts
to "strike surplusage from the indictment or information."  Acting in its
discretion, a district court may strike as surplusage allegations not
relevant to the charge at issue and inflammatory and prejudicial to the
defendant. United States v. Figueroa, 900 F.2d 1211, 1218 (8th Cir.),
cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 110 S.Ct. 3228, 110 L.Ed.2d 675 (1990);
United States v. Ramirez, 710 F.2d 535, 544 (9th Cir.1983);  United States
v. Kemper, 503 F.2d 327, 329 (6th Cir.1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1124,
95 S.Ct. 810, 42 L.Ed.2d 824 (1975);  1 C. Wright, Federal Practice and
Procedure:  Criminal, s 127 at 426 (2d ed. 1982);  see generally Bary
v. United States, 292 F.2d 53, 55-56 (10th Cir.1961) (in Smith Act
prosecution, court properly withdrew from consideration portion of
indictment making reference to the Communist Party). However, language in
the indictment or information describing the essential elements of the
crime alleged is not surplusage and cannot be stricken under Rule 7(d).
Wright s 127 at 426;  see Callanan v. United States, 881 F.2d 229, 236
(6th Cir.1989), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 110 S.Ct. 1816, 108 L.Ed.2d
946 (1990);  United States v. Behenna, 552 F.2d 573, 576 n. 5 (4th
	Dickstein filed a motion pursuant to Rule 7(d) to strike as
surplusage language in the indictment alleging that defendant failed to
pay income taxes.  See rec. vol. IX, doc. 24.  The elements of tax evasion
are:  1) willfulness, 2) existence of a tax deficiency and 3) an
affirmative act constituting an evasion or attempted evasion of the tax.
Sansone v. United States, 380 U.S. 343, 351, 85 S.Ct. 1004, 1010, 13
L.Ed.2d 882 (1965); United States v. Samara, 643 F.2d 701, 703 (10th
Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 829, 102 S.Ct. 122, 70 L.Ed.2d 104 (1981).
Defendant's failure to pay or withhold taxes is an allegation necessary
for the establishment of a tax deficiency, an essential element of the
offense of tax evasion.  At best, Dickstein's motion to strike one of the
prima facia elements from the indictment constituted gross ignorance.
Under this scenario, the district court properly could conclude that
Dickstein was unable to provide defendant with competent representation.
Just as the court in Campbell found that defendant could not receive
competent representation from a lawyer who had not tried a case in
twenty-five years and knew nothing about defendant's case, 874 F.2d at
848-49, so too could the district court below conclude that a defendant
charged with tax evasion would not receive effective assistance of counsel
from an attorney who did not know that failure to pay taxes was an element
of the crime.  Conversely, if Dickstein knew that failure to pay taxes was
an essential element of tax evasion and nevertheless moved to strike such
allegations as surplusage, his motion constituted a material
misrepresentation of the law.
	4. Motion to Suppress Third Party Summons
	Dickstein filed a motion on defendant's behalf seeking suppression
of all evidence obtained by a third-party summons issued by an IRS Special
Agent to the First National Bank of Guthrie, Oklahoma.  Dickstein argued
that such a summons required authorization of an IRS Group Manager;
because it was issued by a Special Agent, the summons was invalid.  He
relied upon IRS Delegation Order No. 4 (Rev. 15), 49 Fed.Reg. 13,946
(1984), which restricted the issuance of summonses in criminal
investigations to Assistant Division Chiefs, Branch Chiefs and Group
Managers.  The district court rejected Dickstein's argument, pointing out
that the cited regulation had been superseded by a new regulation which
added Special Agents to the category of IRS officials authorized to issue
third-party summonses.  See Delegation Order No. 4 (Rev. 17), IR Manual
1229 (May 12, 1986);  Hatcher v. United States, 733 F.Supp. 218, 220-21
(M.D.Pa.1990) (IRS Special Agents have authority to issue third- party
	Standing alone, the inadvertent citation to superseded authority,
while professionally wanting, does not constitute misconduct warranting
disqualification.  However, prior to his involvement in this case,
Dickstein advanced the same argument concerning the third-party summons
while defending a similar tax evasion case in the Western District of
Kentucky.  See rec. vol. X, doc 51, ex. G.  The government's response to
Dickstein's suppression motion in the prior case explicitly pointed out
that the delegation order on which Dickstein relied had been superseded by
subsequent authority.  Id., ex. H. Thus, in the instant case, Dickstein
directed the court's attention to legal authority with constructive
knowledge that such authority had been superseded. As discussed below, the
failure to disclose known dispositive contrary authority precluded
Dickstein from providing competent and ethical representation to
	District courts retain the discretion to adopt local rules
necessary for the conduct of their business.  Frazier v. Heebe, 482
U.S. 641, 645, 107 S.Ct. 2607, 2611, 96 L.Ed.2d 557 (1987);  28 U.S.C. s
1654.  The federal district court for the Western District of Oklahoma has
adopted the Oklahoma Rules of Professional Conduct as the ethical
guidelines governing its practitioners.  See W.D.Okla.R. 4(J)(4)(b).  Rule
3.3(a)(3) of the Oklahoma Rules of Professional Conduct requires attorneys
to disclose contrary authority to the court when advancing a legal
argument. [FN15]  Okla.Stat.Ann. tit. 5, ch. 1, app. 3-A (Supp.1990);  see
City of Oklahoma City v. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n, 789 P.2d 1287, 1298-99
(Okla.1990) (Opala, J., dissenting).  Dickstein violated Rule 3.3 by
misrepresenting to the court the law of federal criminal jurisdiction in
flagrant disregard for controlling constitutional, statutory, and
regulatory authority.  He did not advance a good faith argument why two
hundred years of federalist jurisprudence should be abandoned;  rather, he
sought to indulge the court in the fantasy that the arguments he was
advancing actually comprised the law of the land.  Dickstein also violated
Rule 3.3 by citing legal authority concerning third party IRS summonses
with constructive knowledge that such authority had been superseded.  In
addition, Dickstein's motion to strike language from the indictment
detailing the essential elements of the charged offense constituted a
material misrepresentation of governing legal principles.  Such brazen
subversion of legal argument has no place in the courts of this circuit.
	FN15. The Comment to Rule 3.3 explains: Legal argument based upon
a knowingly false representation of law constitutes dishonesty toward the
tribunal.  A lawyer is not required to make a disinterested exposition of
the law, but must recognize the existence of pertinent legal
authorities....  The underlying concept is that legal argument is a
discussion seeking to determine the legal premises proper applicable to
the case. Okla.Stat.Ann. tit. 5, ch. 1, app. 3-A (Supp.1990).

	Rule 3.3 of the Oklahoma Rules of Professional Conduct provides: A
lawyer shall not bring or defend a proceeding, or assert or controvert an
issue therein, unless there is a basis for doing so that is not frivolous,
which includes a good faith argument for an extension, modification or
reversal of existing law.  A lawyer for the defendant in a criminal
proceeding ... may nevertheless so defend the proceeding as to require
that every element of the case be established. Okla.Stat.Ann. tit. 5,
ch. 1, app. 3-A (Supp.1990).  Under Rule 3.3, a frivolous action is one
where "the client desires to have the action taken primarily for the
purpose of harassing or maliciously injuring a person or if the lawyer is
unable either to make a good faith argument on the merits of the
action...."  Id., comment.  Dickstein's motion to dismiss for violation of
the Paperwork Reduction Act was utterly lacking in any arguable basis in
law or fact as was his contention that defendant was not an "individual"
under the Internal Revenue Code.  The only possible purpose behind these
motions was to harass the prosecution and the court.  Dickstein therefore
violated Rule 3.1 by advancing a frivolous argument before the district
	In evaluating the merits of Dickstein's pleadings, we remain
mindful that defense attorneys must, of necessity advance unpopular
arguments in the course of fulfilling their ethical obligation to
zealously represent their client's interests.  See Oklahoma Rule of
Professional Conduct 3.1, Okla.Stat.Ann. tit. 5, ch. 1, app. 3-A
(Supp.1990). [FN16]  However, the sixth amendment does not encompass a
defendant's effort to transform judicial proceedings into a forum for the
advancement of political, economic or social views and the obfuscation of
the legal and factual questions at issue.  A criminal trial is, first and
foremost, a vehicle for the structured discovery of truth.  Advocacy which
contravenes the truth-seeking function of the criminal trial and
deliberately misrepresents the legal authority governing the proceeding
has no place in a court of law.  See Lonsdale, 919 F.2d at 1447- 48
(imposing sanctions on pro se litigants advancing frivolous arguments
concerning inapplicability of tax laws);  Casper v. Commissioner, 805 F.2d
902, 905 (10th Cir., 1986) (same);  Miller, 868 F.2d at 241-42 (same).  By
advancing arguments "not warranted by existing law or a good faith
argument for the extension, modification or reversal of existing law,"
Casper, 805 F.2d at 905, Dickstein transformed legal argument from an
intellectual process aimed at the derivation of the correct legal
principle to a carnival of frivolity aimed at disseminating defendant's
political views.  When combined with Dickstein's past reputation for
hijacking judicial proceedings onto his tax protester bandwagon, the
district court legitimately concluded that Dickstein's disregard for
governing ethical principles would continue throughout the case, robbing
the trial of its elementary truth-seeking purpose and depriving defendant
of the effective assistance of counsel.

	FN16. The comment to Oklahoma Rule of Professional Conduct Rule
1.3 provides in part: A lawyer should pursue a matter on behalf of a
client despite opposition, obstruction or personal inconvenience to the
lawyer, and may take whatever lawful and ethical measures are required to
vindicate a client's cause or endeavor.  A lawyer should act with
commitment and dedication to the interests of the client and with zeal in
advocacy upon the client's behalf.  Okla.Stat.Ann. tit. 5, ch. 1, app. 3-A

	"Those who use the tools of the legal profession to prostitute its
high standards of ethical and moral conduct serve only to destroy the
admirable goals and aims of our criminal justice system."  United States
v. Blitstein, 626 F.2d 774, 781 (10th Cir.1980), cert. denied, 449
U.S. 1102, 101 S.Ct. 898, 66 L.Ed.2d 828 (1981).  While the power to
disqualify an attorney from a case "is one which ought to be exercised
with great caution," it is "incidental to all courts, and is necessary for
the preservation of decorum, and for the respectability of the
profession."  Ex Parte Burr, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat) 529, 529-30, 6 L.Ed. 152
(1824) (Marshall, C.J.).  In this case, the district court correctly
balanced defendant's right to retain counsel of his choice against
society's need for the orderly administration of justice and the ethical
practice of law.  We hold that the court acted properly to maintain the
integrity of the proceeding by discharging defendant's counsel of choice
from further participation in the case.