596 F.Supp. 240

                       Phillip W. SNYDER, Plaintiff,
      INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE and John A. Dietrich, Agent, Defendants.
                             Civ. No. F 84-211.
                       United States District Court,
                               N.D. Indiana,
                           Fort Wayne Division.
                              Oct. 18, 1984.

	Phillip W. Snyder, pro se.
	Peter Sklarew, Civ. Trial Sec., Tax Div., Dept. of Justice,
Washington, D.C., David H. Miller, Asst. U.S. Atty., Fort Wayne, Ind., for


	LEE, District Judge.
	This matter is before the court on defendants' Motion to Dismiss
and for an Award of Attorneys' Fees and Costs filed August 28, 1984.  For
the following reasons, defendants' motion will be granted in its entirety.
	Plaintiff is proceeding pro se.  Pro se pleadings are to be
liberally construed.  Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 92 S.Ct. 594, 30
L.Ed.2d 652 (1972).  This court also recognizes that federal courts have
historically exercised great tolerance to insure that an impartial forum
remains available to plaintiffs invoking the jurisdiction of the court
without the guidance of trained counsel.  Pro se complaints, such as
plaintiff's, are held to less stringent pleading requirements;  technical
rigor in the examination of such pleadings is inappropriate.
	Liberally construing plaintiff's complaint and numerous other
filings, as well as plaintiff's comments made at the preliminary pre-trial
conference held in Open Court on August 27, 1984, it appears that the
plaintiff is contesting the withholding of his wages by his employer as
part of the statutorily defined scheme for collecting income taxes.
Plaintiff believes that he is not subject to the Internal Revenue Code of
1954 ("Code"), and that by the assessing of taxes against him, the
assessing of fines for the filing of certain W-4 forms in which plaintiff
claimed an "exempt status," and the threat of a possible levy of his
property should he fail to pay the taxes, plaintiff's constitutional
rights have been harmed.  The list of the rights allegedly violated grows
with each pleading plaintiff filed in this court.  In Open Court,
plaintiff delineated the following:  (1) violation of the fourth amendment
because his property was "seized" when money was withheld from his
paycheck;  (2) deprivation of due process because plaintiff asked for
appeal and then was told it was denied;  (3) violation of the fifth
amendment right of self-incrimination because the Internal Revenue Service
("IRS") asked for records and information but denied plaintiff's request
of being protected from being a witness against himself.  In filings after
the hearing, plaintiff has also claimed violations of the fourth amendment
for the assessment of two separate $500.00 fines for attempting to fill
out false W-4 forms, and that the Final Notice of Tax Deficiency sent to
plaintiff constituted a Bill of Pains and Penalties.  Plaintiff seeks an
injunction and $900,000 in damages. The complaint was originally filed in
state court, and removed to this court on motion of the defendants.
	Defendants have responded by filing a motion to dismiss.  The
thrust of the motion is two-fold:  (1) neither of the defendants can be
sued because they are protected by immunity;  and (2) all allegations in
the complaint are without merit, and therefore subject to dismissal.
Defendants have also moved for fees and costs for defending this action.
	The court begins with the motion to dismiss.
	Although the defendants have characterized their motion as a
motion to dismiss, it is clear that the issues presented by this motion
are best addressed after reference is made to the exhibits, pleadings, and
statements made in Open Court in this case.  When matters outside the
pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court, a motion to
dismiss will be converted into a motion for summary judgment under Rule 56
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.  See Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b).
	Under Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, summary
judgment may only be granted if "the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if
any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that
the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."
Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c).  Thus, summary judgment serves as a vehicle with which
the court "can determine whether further exploration of the facts is
necessary."  Hahn v. Sargent, 523 F.2d 461, 464 (1st Cir.1975).
	In making this determination, the court must keep in mind that the
entry of summary judgment terminates the litigation, or an aspect thereof,
and must draw all inferences from the established or asserted facts in
favor of the non-moving party.  Peoples Outfitting Co. v. General Electric
Credit Corp., 549 F.2d 42 (7th Cir.1977).  A party may not rest on the
mere allegations of his pleadings or the bare contentions that an issue of
fact exists.  Posey v. Skyline Corp., 702 F.2d 102, 105 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 104 S.Ct. 392, 78 L.Ed.2d 336 (1983).  See
Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 26 L.Ed.2d 142
(1970).  See also Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway v. United
Transportation Union, 734 F.2d 317 (7th Cir.1984); Korf v. Ball State
University, 726 F.2d 1222 (7th Cir.1984).  See generally C. Wright, Law of
Federal Courts, s 99 (4th ed. 1983);  6 Moore's Federal Practice, s 56.15
(2d ed. 1984).
	Thus, the moving party must demonstrate the absence of a genuine
issue of material fact.  The court views all evidence submitted in favor
of the non-moving party.  Even if there are some disputed facts, where the
undisputed facts are the material facts involved and those facts show one
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, summary judgment is
appropriate. Egger v. Phillips, 710 F.2d 292, 296-97 (7th Cir.1983);
Collins v. American Optometric Assn., 693 F.2d 636, 639 (7th Cir.1982).
Further, if the court resolves all factual disputes in favor of the
non-moving party and still finds summary judgment in favor of the moving
party is correct as a matter of law, then the moving party is entitled to
summary judgment in his favor. Egger, 710 F.2d at 297.  See also Bishop
v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 348, 348 n. 11, 96 S.Ct. 2074, 2079, 2079 n. 11, 48
L.Ed.2d 684 (1976).
	Although not raised by the defendants directly in their motion to
dismiss, the court turns first to the issue of whether a proper basis for
jurisdiction exists for hearing this cause.  Because of the limited nature
of a district court's jurisdiction, the court may inquire into its
jurisdiction sua sponte.  Rice v. Rice Foundation, 610 F.2d 471 (7th
	A. Jurisdiction
	Plaintiff's original complaint asserted two bases for
jurisdiction:  the United States and Indiana constitutions.  Under a
section entitled "Venue," plaintiff also cites to 42 U.S.C. ss 1981, 1983,
and 1986, the civil rights statutes, and 18 U.S.C. ss 241, 242, criminal
statutes.  None of these provisions give this court adequate jurisdiction
to hear this cause.
	The civil rights statutes, 42 U.S.C. ss 1981, 1983, and 1986
cannot provide jurisdiction in actions against the assessment or
collection of taxes.  Section 1981 is restricted by the import of its
language to discrimination based on race or color.  Virginia v. Rives, 100
U.S. (10 Otto) 313, 25 L.Ed. 667 (1880);  Willingham v. Macon Telegraph
Publishing Co., 482 F.2d 535, 537 n. 1 (5th Cir.1973).  In fact, the
language of s 1981 militates against plaintiff's case, because the section
provides that "all persons" shall be subject to taxes.  Section 1983
prohibits deprivation of rights under color of state law.  However,
actions of IRS officials, even if beyond the scope of their official
duties, are acts done under color of federal law and not state law, thus
making s 1983 inapplicable.  Seibert v. Baptist, 594 F.2d 423 (5th
Cir.1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 918, 100 S.Ct. 1851, 64 L.Ed.2d 271
(1980);  Mack v. Alexander, 575 F.2d 488, 489 (5th Cir.1978). Section 1986
creates a cause of action for failure or neglect to prevent a s 1985
conspiracy.  However, s 1985(1) deals with conspiring to prevent an
official from discharging his duties, while s 1985(2) deals with
obstructing justice, both of which are inapplicable here.  Section 1985(3)
requires that there be "some racial, or perhaps otherwise class-based,
invidiously discriminating animus behind the conspirators' action,"
Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 102, 91 S.Ct. 1790, 1798, 29 L.Ed.2d
338 (1971); Dunn v. State of Tennessee, 697 F.2d 121 (6th Cir.1982),
cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1086, 103 S.Ct. 1778, 76 L.Ed.2d 349 (1983), none
of which is present here.  It is therefore obvious that none of these
statutory provisions can provide plaintiff with a basis for suit.
	A similar conclusion results after analyzing 18 U.S.C. ss 241 and
242, which are also offered by the plaintiff as grounds for "venue."
Section 241 makes it a crime for two or more persons to conspire to injure
the rights of a citizen, while s 242 makes it a crime to violate the civil
rights of a person.  In short, they are simply the criminal law versions
of 42 U.S.C. ss 1985 and 1983.  As such, plaintiff's civil action cannot
be based on the criminal statute but must be based on the statutes
granting a civil cause of action (ss 1983 and 1985), which are not present
here.  Plaintiff seems to admit that ss 241 and 242 do not give him a
private cause of action when he states "Title 18 U.S.C. was quoted in
original Complaint in case a grand Jury wished to bring additional
Criminal charges.  Also, if the United States of America wished to police
the actions of the defendants."  Plaintiff's Answer to the Court in re of
Instruments Submitted by the Defendants, filed September 14, 1984, P
D-2(d), p. 6.  Thus, this court gains no jurisdiction over this action by
virtue of 18 U.S.C. ss 241 or 242.
	The only other basis for jurisdiction is 28 U.S.C. s 1331, the
federal question jurisdiction statute.  Plaintiff claims that the tax laws
do not apply to him because the laws are unconstitutional.  He also claims
that certain constitutional rights were violated by the actions of the
defendants. This is sufficient to give rise to some kind of federal
question jurisdiction based on the constitutional issues involved in such
claims.  However, not all aspects of the plaintiff's claims are cognizable
under this jurisdiction.
	Plaintiff has made clear that he does not seek a tax refund.
Rather, he wants injunctive relief and damages.  As to injunctive relief,
plaintiff's claim is barred by 26 U.S.C. s 7421, which provides in
pertinent part that "no suit for the purpose of restraining the assessment
or collection of any tax shall be maintained in any court by any person,
whether or not such person is the person against whom such tax was
assessed."  Nor does the judicially created exception to this
anti-injunction provision, outlined in Enochs v. Williams Packing and
Navigation Co., 370 U.S. 1, 82 S.Ct. 1125, 8 L.Ed.2d 292 (1962), apply
here because neither one of its elements (that government cannot prevail
on the merits and plaintiff has no adequate remedy at law) is present in
this case.  Thus, this court has no jurisdiction to grant injunctive
	As for damages, the plaintiff must show that he can recover
damages for violations stemming from the defendants' alleged
unconstitutional activity. Plaintiff can obtain damages against the
defendants under only one of two theories:  a claim under the Federal Tort
Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. ss 2671- 2680;  or an implied cause of action under
the principles of Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 91
S.Ct. 1999, 29 L.Ed.2d 619 (1977).  As will be more fully discussed in
section I.B. of this order, a claim under the Federal Tort Claims Act will
fail on principles of sovereign immunity. Furthermore, in Seibert
v. Baptist, 594 F.2d 423, 429-32 (5th Cir.1979), cert. denied, 446
U.S. 918, 100 S.Ct. 1851, 64 L.Ed.2d 271 (1980), the court refused to
recognize a Bivens -type cause of action against the IRS and IRS officials
and agents.  The actions of the present defendants in assessing the taxes
and penalties against the plaintiff and in generally operating under the
IRS regulatory framework were not of the outrageous nature of those found
in Bivens.  This court agrees with the Seibert court and refuses to
recognize a Bivens -type cause of action against the IRS or IRS officials
and agents for the collection and assessment of taxes.
	Thus, while a federal question may exist, it provides no basis for
plaintiff to recover injunctive relief or damages.  At the very best, it
would allow this court to declare the Internal Revenue Code
unconstitutional (which the court does not do ) as a prelude to a refund
suit, which plaintiff explicitly states he is not now pursuing.  In short,
federal question jurisdiction does not support plaintiff's suit.
	On the issue of jurisdiction, then, this court finds that it has
no jurisdiction over any of plaintiff's claims with the exception of
extremely limited federal question jurisdiction over the question of the
constitutionality of the Internal Revenue Code.  However, out of an
abundance of caution and a desire to give plaintiff a full review of his
case, the court continues by analyzing the other issues in the Motion to
	B. The "Suability" of the Defendants
	A main thrust of defendants' Motion to Dismiss is that none of the
named defendants can be sued.  Plaintiff has named two defendants:  the
IRS;  and John Dietrich, an IRS agent.  Because the defendants' arguments
revolve around the status of these defendants and whether such status
allows the particular defendant to be sued, the court will analyze each
defendant separately.
1. The Internal Revenue Service
	The core of defendants' argument about the inability of plaintiff
to sue the IRS is the doctrine of sovereign immunity.  It is well settled
that the United States is a sovereign and, as such, is immune from suit
without its prior consent.  United States v. Shaw, 309 U.S. 495, 500-01,
60 S.Ct. 659, 661, 84 L.Ed. 888 (1940);  Hutchinson v. United States, 677
F.2d 1322, 1327 (9th Cir.1982);  Akers v. United States, 539 F.Supp. 831,
832 (D.Conn.1982), aff'd, 718 F.2d 1084 (2d Cir.1983).  Absent consent to
sue, dismissal of the action is required.  Hutchinson, 677 F.2d at 1327.
The United States has waived its immunity with respect to some causes of
action in the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. ss 1346 and 2671-2680.
However, the Act, in s 2680(c), specifically excluded "any claim arising
in respect of the assessment or collection of any tax or customs duty...."
It is thus clear that the United States has specifically reserved its
immunity with respect to claims arising out of tax collection and
assessment.  Thus, to the extent that any part of plaintiff's complaint
can be construed as a claim against the United States, it is barred by the
doctrine of sovereign immunity.  See Hutchinson;  Seibert v. Baptist, 594
F.2d 423 (5th Cir.1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 918, 100 S.Ct. 1851, 64
L.Ed.2d 271 (1980);  White v. Commissioner, 537 F.Supp. 679, 684
	Plaintiff has attempted to make clear that his claim is not
against the United States, but rather against the IRS.  That is of little
help to plaintiff because courts have found that the actions of the IRS or
its agents fall under the Federal Tort Claims Act exception for collection
and assessment of taxes.   See Morris v. United States, 521 F.2d 872, 874
(9th Cir.1975); Spilman v. Crebo, 561 F.Supp. 652, 654-55 (D.Mont.1982).
It is therefore clear that the IRS is immune from suit for tax collection
or assessment activities.
	Plaintiff apparently believes that this conclusion is avoided by
his assertion that the IRS is a "private corporation," and not a part of
the United States.  Plaintiff offers two arguments for this conclusion.
The first is that the IRS was never created by "positive law" (i.e., a
statute of Congress) but by fiat of the Secretary of the Treasury in 1952.
It is clear, however, that the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, a statute of
Congress, gave the Secretary of the Treasury full authority to administer
and enforce the Code, 26 U.S.C. s 7801, and the power to create an agency
to administer and enforce the tax laws.  See 26 U.S.C. s 7803(a).
Pursuant to that legislative grant of authority, the Secretary created the
IRS, 26 C.F.R. s 601.101, so that the IRS is an agency of the Department
of the Treasury, created pursuant to Congressional statute.  As such, the
IRS is a creature of "positive law," and an agency of the federal
government, not a private corporation.
	The second argument for the IRS being a "private corporation" is
that the IRS deposits the tax revenues in the federal reserve banks, and
thus acts as a "collection agent" for those banks, who use the money to
make loans, and conduct proprietary business, thus removing the cloak of
governmental immunity.  This argument is patently false from its first
leap of logic.  While the Secretary may authorize federal reserve banks
(as well as other financial institutions) to receive tax payments, 26
U.S.C. s 6302(c), it is clear that those institutions receive the payments
as agents for the United States.  In short, the IRS is the Treasury's
collection agent, not the Federal Reserve Board's.  Tax dollars are used
for governmental, not proprietary, purposes.  It is thus clear that the
IRS acts for the government as a governmental agency, and is entitled to
the sovereign immunity of the United States.  Plaintiff's disingenuous
attempts to deny the facts do not change this conclusion.  See Cameron
v. IRS, 593 F.Supp. 1540, at 1549 (N.D.Ind.1984);  Young v. IRS, 596
F.Supp. 141, at 147 (N.D.Ind. 1984).
2. Agent Dietrich
	Plaintiff has also named IRS agent Dietrich as a defendant.  None
of the allegations of the complaint specifically describe his allegedly
wrongful activities.  However, the thrust of plaintiff's complaint is
against the withholding of taxes from his wages, and so to the extent that
Agent Dietrich was involved, the court assumes that his actions were done
within his official capacity as an IRS agent in enforcing the withholding
provisions of the Code. [FN1]

	FN1. Additional support for this assumption is found in
"Plaintiff's Answer to the Court in re of Instruments Submitted by the
Defendants and/or their Counsel," in which the plaintiff describes a levy
on his wages (P B- 1(a) through (i)), and then states "it was John
A. Dietrich who did willingly aid and abate [sic] the defendant(s) in
their unlawful type of action/actions."  This strongly indicates that
defendant Dietrich was named because of the action taken in his official
capacity as an IRS agent.

	As was noted earlier, the United States has not waived its
sovereign immunity with respect to claims arising out of tax assessment or
collection. One cannot avoid this sovereign immunity by simply naming
officials when the judgment would impact upon the public treasury.
Vishnevsky v. United States, 581 F.2d 1249, 1255 (7th Cir.1978).  At least
one court has held that a suit against IRS officials in their official
capacity is a suit against the United States, see Nelson v. Regan, 560
F.Supp. 1101 (D.Conn.1983), so that sovereign immunity would preclude the
	The United States Supreme Court, in Butz v. Economou, 438
U.S. 478, 98 S.Ct. 2894, 57 L.Ed.2d 895 (1978), discussed the extent of
the immunity that a federal executive officer enjoys within the parameters
of a federal agency position.  The Court found that a federal official
enjoyed only a qualified immunity, so that he could be liable individually
if he knows or should have known that he is acting outside the law.
Id. at 506-07, 98 S.Ct. at 2911. The Court recognized, however, that some
officials need absolute immunity because it is "essential for the conduct
of the public business."  Id. at 507, 98 S.Ct. at 2911.  Some courts have
read Butz as giving absolute immunity to IRS officials in actions for
damages.  Hutchinson v. United States, 677 F.2d 1322 (9th Cir.1982);
Stankevitz v. IRS, 640 F.2d 205 (9th Cir.1981); Krzyske v. Commissioner,
548 F.Supp. 101 (E.D.Mich.1982);  White v. Commissioner, 537 F.Supp. 679,
684 (D.Colo.1982).  If the officials are alleged to have exceeded their
authority and to have operated outside the scope of their official duties,
then only the qualified immunity applies. Hutchinson, 677 F.2d at 1328;
Nelson v. Regan, 560 F.Supp. 1101 (D.Conn.1983);  Spilman v. Crebo, 561
F.Supp. 652, 655-56 (D.Mont.1982).  In order to present a situation where
only the qualified immunity will apply, the complaint must contain
specific allegations of the unconstitutional conduct by the official,
White, 537 F.Supp. at 684, and must allege the specific statutory
provisions under which the official exceeded his authority. Spilman, 561
F.Supp. at 655-56.
	The tenor of plaintiff's complaint is that he seeks damages from
Agent Dietrich for acts done in his official capacity as an IRS agent.
The levy on a taxpayer's wages is clearly within the statutory power of
the IRS and its agents, and the withholding of taxes is sanctioned by the
Code.  Because such acts are done within Agent Dietrich's official duties,
the absolute immunity applies and the suit against him must fail.  See
Cameron v. IRS, 593 F.Supp. 1540, at 1550-1551 (N.D.Ind.1984);  Young
v. IRS, 596 F.Supp. 141, at 147 - 48 (N.D.Ind. 1984).
	Under the principles of summary judgment, the defendants have
shown that there is no genuine issue of material fact in dispute between
the parties, and the immunity of the IRS and Agent Dietrich entitles them
to summary judgment as a matter of law.  However, again out of an
abundance of caution, this court now considers the merits of the various
claims made by the plaintiff.
	C. Merits of the Claim
	Plaintiff's case is built around two arguments which plaintiff
believes entitle him to recover:  (1) that the tax laws do not apply to
him;  and (2) that his fourth amendment, fifth amendment and due process
rights were violated.  The court will analyze each of these contentions in
1. The Applicability of the Tax Laws
	Plaintiff's arguments for the inapplicability of the tax laws to
him are somewhat convoluted.  Liberally construed, the arguments rest upon
the premise that plaintiff's wages are not income within the meaning of
the sixteenth amendment.
	The plaintiff argues that only gain or profit can be income for
taxation purposes.  To support this claim, plaintiff cites to two Supreme
Court cases, Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189, 40 S.Ct. 189, 64 L.Ed. 521
(1919), and Goodrich v. Edwards, 255 U.S. 527, 41 S.Ct. 390, 65 L.Ed. 758
(1921), which cites the "income as gain" language of Eisner.  Plaintiff
also cites several very old lower federal court decisions as well.
However, none of these cases were intended to be definitive definitions of
income;  in fact, all involved questions of specific former tax laws.  The
Supreme Court rejected an argument, based on Eisner, that the Code's
definition of income is limited to gain in Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass
Co., 348 U.S. 426, 75 S.Ct. 473, 99 L.Ed. 483 (1955).  The Court
specifically stated that the "income as gain" definition of Eisner "was
not meant to provide a touchstone to all future gross income questions."
Id. at 431, 75 S.Ct. at 477.  More recently the Court rejected the
assumption that the current statutory definition of income (in 26 U.S.C. s
61) incorporated the income as gain definition of Eisner.  See
Commissioner v. Kowalski, 434 U.S. 77, 94, 98 S.Ct. 315, 325, 54 L.Ed.2d
252 (1977).  Thus, the first assumption behind plaintiff's argument is
simply incorrect--income is not limited to gain or profit.
	The second half of plaintiff's argument is that wages are not
profit or gain because they are given in equal exchange for the services
he renders for Magnavox.  Whether the economic view of wages as exchange
for services is correct, the Supreme Court has, as noted above, rejected
the notion that the income as gain concept is inherent in the s 61
definition of gross income.  In Kowalski, the Court embraced the s 61
definition, id. at 83, 98 S.Ct. at 319, which defines the concept as
follows:  "... gross income means all income from whatever source derived,
including ... (1) compensation for services...." This analysis has led the
Seventh Circuit to declare in the clearest language possible that "WAGES
ARE INCOME."  United States v. Koliboski, 732 F.2d 1328, 1328 n. 1 (7th
Cir.1984).  Many other courts have reached the same conclusion.  See,
e.g., Granzow v. Commissioner, 739 F.2d 265, at 267 (7th Cir.1984);
Lively v. Commissioner, 705 F.2d 1017 (8th Cir.1983); Knighten
v. Commissioner, 702 F.2d 59, 60 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----,
104 S.Ct. 249, 78 L.Ed.2d 237 (1983);  United States v. Romero, 640 F.2d
1014, 1016 (9th Cir.1981).  In Romero, the court rejected a "wages are not
income" argument, and underscored its conclusion by noting: "Compensation
for labor or services, paid in the form of wages or salary, has been
universally held by the courts of this republic to be income, subject to
the income tax laws currently applicable."  Id. at 1016.  This court has
also previously held that wages are income.  See Cameron v. IRS, 1552;
Young v. IRS, 149.
	It is thus unmistakably clear that plaintiff is wrong in
concluding that his wages are not taxable income.  The initial assumption
behind the argument (that income is gain or profit) is incorrect because
it is not exclusive.  True, a gain or profit is income.  That does not,
however, mean that all income must be a gain or profit.  Section 61 makes
clear that wages are income for taxation purposes, so that plaintiff's
arguments are simply incorrect and without a basis in law.  The tax laws
therefore apply with full force to the plaintiff.
2. Fourth Amendment Claims
	Plaintiff makes two claims under the fourth amendment.  First,
plaintiff argues that the withholding of monies from his wages constitutes
an illegal "seizure."  However, plaintiff does not have a fourth amendment
interest to protect here.  The Supreme Court has stated that a tax
assessment "is given the force of a judgment, and if the amount assessed
is not paid when due, administrative officials may seize the debtor's
property to satisfy the debt."  Bull v. United States, 295 U.S. 247, 260,
55 S.Ct. 695, 699, 79 L.Ed. 1421 (1935).  In Phillips v. Commissioner, 283
U.S. 589, 596-97, 51 S.Ct. 608, 611, 75 L.Ed. 1289 (1931), the Court
rejected a due process challenge to the statutory system of collecting
taxes without a pre-seizing hearing.  The Phillips Court held that as long
as the taxpayer had an opportunity to have his rights determined after the
seizure, the requirements of due process were satisfied.  More recently,
the Court applied this analysis to fourth amendment concerns as well.
G.M. Leasing Corp. v. United States, 429 U.S. 338, 352 n. 18, 97
S.Ct. 619, 628 n. 18, 50 L.Ed.2d 530 (1977).  The Court there found that
fourth amendment concerns arise only when there is an invasion of the
plaintiff's privacy.  Here, no such invasion took place because the money
was withheld when it was neither in plaintiff's private possession nor
subject to his private control.  Of course, this same analysis applies to
the levy on plaintiff's wages described in the "Plaintiff's Answer to the
Court in re of Instruments Submitted by the Defendants and/or their
Counsel" as well.  With the ability to sue for a refund, plaintiff's
rights can be protected without the need for fourth amendment causes of
action.  This court refuses to recognize a cause of action for the normal
withholding of wages on fourth amendment grounds.
3. Fifth Amendment Claims
	Plaintiff alleges a violation of his fifth amendment right against
self-incrimination in being forced to give information without the
assurance that the information would not be used against him.  The Seventh
Circuit has specifically stated that "we have no hesitation in holding
that the Fifth Amendment has no application to the statutory requirement
that every citizen must report his entire income even if a taxpayer is
thereby compelled to disclose an incriminating fact."  United States
v. Oliver, 505 F.2d 301, 308 (7th Cir.1974).  In short, plaintiff does not
have a fifth amendment interest to protect when he turns information over
to the IRS concerning his income.  Therefore, his fifth amendment claim is
without basis in the law.
4. Due Process Claims
	Plaintiff alleges that his due process rights were violated
because he requested an appeal and was denied.  To the extent that
plaintiff's allegation means that the IRS considered plaintiff's appeal
and denied it because it was without merit, there was no violation of due
process as plaintiff had an appeal.  To the extent that plaintiff was not
granted an appeal, he was not foreclosed from any reconsideration of his
claim.  Plaintiff still can sue for a refund, see 26 U.S.C. s 7422, after
all the statutory prerequisites are met, and thus has not been foreclosed
from receiving the process he is due. This court can perceive no harm done
to plaintiff's due process rights.
5. Other Claims
	Although not alleged in the complaint, other claims can be gleaned
from plaintiff's numerous filings, and are addressed briefly here.
Plaintiff asserts that a Final Notice sent to plaintiff (demanding that
the plaintiff pay back taxes or have his wages levied) was a "Bill of
Pains and Penalties," a lesser form of a Bill of Attainder.  This court
has twice before rejected the Bill of Attainder/Pains and Penalties
argument.  Current interpretation of the Bill of Attainder clause defines
a bill of attainder as a legislative act which determines guilt and
punishes an identifiable individual or group of individuals.  See Nixon
v. Administrator of General Services, 433 U.S. 425, 468, 97 S.Ct. 2777,
2802, 53 L.Ed.2d 867 (1977).  However, none of these elements are present
in tax protestor cases such as this.  See Cameron v. IRS, 1555-1556;
Young v. IRS, 150.  This argument has been and continues to be meritless.
	Plaintiff also briefly mentions the lack of an Office of
Management and Budget ("OMB") number on certain IRS documents.  Plaintiff
gives no reason why this fact should matter.  However, this court notes
that it has previously held that IRS documents do not need to carry OMB
numbers to be valid under 44 U.S.C. s 3512.  Cameron v. IRS, 593
F.Supp. 1540 (N.D.Ind.1984).  That allegation is simply meritless.
	An analysis of defendants' converted motion to dismiss reveals
that plaintiff has not asserted a competent basis for jurisdiction, cannot
sue any of the defendants because they are immune, and even if he could
overcome these two barriers to recovery, could not prevail because his
complaint contains nothing other than meritless and baseless claims.  It
is abundantly clear that there are no genuine issues of material fact and
that the defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  This
court will therefore grant the defendants summary judgment on the entire
	The American Rule is that absent specific statutory or other
expressed authorization, attorney fees are not recoverable by the
prevailing party in a lawsuit.  International Union v. J. Pease
Construction Co., 541 F.Supp. 1334, 1337 (N.D.Ill.1982).  An exception to
this rule has been recognized where a losing party has "acted in bad
faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive reasons...."  Alyeska
Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society, 421 U.S. 240, 258-59, 95
S.Ct. 1612, 1622-23, 44 L.Ed.2d 141 (1975).  See McCandless v. Great
Atlantic and Pacific Tea Co., 697 F.2d 198 (7th Cir.1983).
	The Seventh Circuit has made clear that bad faith can include the
pursuit of meritless suits.  In Analytica, Inc. v. NPD Research, Inc., 708
F.2d 1263 (7th Cir.1983), the court held that insistence on litigating a
question in the face of controlling precedents which removed every
colorable basis in law for the litigant's position amounted to bad faith
justifying an award of fees.  Id. at 1269-70.  In Reid v. United States,
715 F.2d 1148 (7th Cir.1983), the Seventh Circuit stated that "the law may
be so clear and well established that persistence in a course of
litigation could be evidence of bad faith."  Id. at 1154.  Thus, this
court has sufficient equitable power to assess sanctions for fees and
costs if it finds that plaintiff's claim is meritless and in bad faith.
	A second source of power to impose sanctions is found in the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.  Rule 11, which governs the signing of
pleadings and motions, requires that each pleading or motion be signed by
an attorney or the party (if the party is proceeding pro se ).  The rule
then provides: The signature of an attorney or party constitutes a
certificate by him that he has read the pleading, motion, other other
paper;  that to the best of his knowledge, information and belief formed
after reasonable inquiry it is well grounded in fact and is warranted by
existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or
reversal of existing law, and that it is not interposed for any improper
purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless
increase in the cost of litigation. If a pleading violates this rule the
court "shall impose" an "appropriate sanction," which may include the
amount of reasonable expenses and attorney's fees incurred by the other
party because of the filing of the pleading or motion.
	The Notes of the Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules makes it
clear that Rule 11's provisions are designed to "discourage dilatory or
abusive tactics and [to] help streamline the litigation process by
lessening frivolous claims or defenses."  The rule applies to anyone who
signs a pleading, motion, or other paper, and the same standards apply to
pro se litigants, although the concerns of Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519,
92 S.Ct. 594, 30 L.Ed.2d 652 (1972), can be taken into account.
	The core of Rule 11 is that the signature on the pleading
certifies that "to the best of his knowledge, information and belief
formed after reasonable inquiry it [the pleading, motion or paper] is well
grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law or a good faith argument
for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law ..."
(emphasis added).  What is important to note is that this language
requires more than just a belief that the law is or should be a certain
way;  as the Advisory Committee states, "what constitutes a reasonable
inquiry may depend on ... whether the pleading, motion, or other paper was
based on a plausible view of the law," and is thus a "more stringent"
standard than good faith.
	Despite the apparently objective nature of this standard, two
recent Seventh Circuit opinions have emphasized that Rule 11 requires a
finding of subjective bad faith on the part of the person against whom
fees are to be assessed. Suslick v. Rothschild Securities Corp., 741 F.2d
1000, at 1007 (7th Cir.1984);  Badillo v. Central Steel and Wire Co., 717
F.2d 1160, 1166-67 (7th Cir.1983).  What constitutes subjective bad faith
is not completely clear, although the Suslick court did reemphasize that a
claim lacking even a colorable basis in law can justify the award of fees.
At ----. However, it is clear that the Seventh Circuit has recognized the
propriety of assessing fees in cases involving parties who claim not to
owe income taxes or who file frivolous tax appeals.  See Granzow
v. Commissioner, 739 F.2d 265, at 269-270 (7th Cir.1984).  Other circuits
have also awarded costs for groundless actions involving the tax laws.
See Parker v. Commissioner, 724 F.2d 469 (5th Cir.1984);  United States
v. Hart, 701 F.2d 749, 750 (8th Cir.1983);  McCoy v. Commissioner, 696
F.2d 1234, 1237 (9th Cir.1983).
	Under both general equitable principles and the provisions of Rule
11, this case is clearly one which merits the imposition of sanctions.
Here, the plaintiff has argued that the Internal Revenue Code does not
apply to him;  yet courts have consistently ruled that wages are taxable
income.  Such argument in light of these clear precedents constitutes
insistence on litigating a question in the face of controlling precedents
that remove any colorable basis in law for the claim.  This is precisely
the kind of evidence which justifies a finding of subjective bad faith
under the Seventh Circuit standard. Plaintiff's other meritless arguments
are further evidence of bad faith.  Even under the principles of Haines
v. Kerner, and the deference to be accorded a pro se litigant's right to
seek redress in court, this court finds that plaintiff's entire suit was
frivolous and brought in bad faith.
	In an analogous situation, the Seventh Circuit stated: The doors
of this courthouse are, of course, open to good faith appeals of what are
honestly thought to be errors of the lower courts.  But we can no longer
tolerate abuse of the judicial review process by irresponsible taxpayers
who press stale and frivolous arguments, without hope of success on the
merits, in order to delay or harass the collection of public revenues or
for other nonworthy purposes....  Abusers of the tax system have no
license to make irresponsible demands on the courts of appeals to consider
fanciful arguments put forward in bad faith.  In the future we will deal
harshly with frivolous tax appeals and will not hesitate to impose even
greater sanctions under appropriate circumstances. Granzow v. Commissioner
of Internal Revenue, 739 F.2d 265, at 269-270 (7th Cir.1984).  Similarly,
the doors of this courthouse are open to good faith litigation, but abuse
of the judicial process, as in this case, will not be tolerated.
Accordingly, the defendants' request for attorney fees, costs and expenses
will be granted.  This court finds the reasonable attorney fees to be
$500.00.  See Cameron v. IRS, 593 F.Supp. 1540 (N.D.Ind.1984);  Young
v. IRS, 596 F.Supp. 141, (N.D.Ind. 1984).
	This court is concerned not only with compensating the defendants
for their needless expense, but also with discouraging these baseless
suits.  The greatest harm inflicted by frivolous tax protestor suits such
as this one is the enormous waste of precious judicial resources they
cause.  The time needed to dispose of these suits forces needless delay
upon litigants with meritorious claims.  This court refuses to condone
further irresponsible uses of the courts.  Rule 11 grants this court full
power to impose sanctions upon litigants who file meritless pleadings and
arguments, and all future litigants were warned by this court in footnote
4 of Cameron v. IRS.  Although plaintiff was not aware of the holding in
Cameron, he was informed in Open Court of the possibility that sanctions
would be imposed against him.  Analysis of the case leads this court to
conclude that plaintiff should be fined $500.00 under Rule 11 for bringing
this meritless suit.
	For the foregoing reasons, defendants' Motion to Dismiss is
converted into a motion for summary judgment, and this court hereby GRANTS
the defendants summary judgment on the entire complaint.  The court also
GRANTS defendants' motion for fees and costs, and hereby ORDERS plaintiff
to pay defendants $500.00 for having to defend against this meritless
action.  The court also hereby ORDERS plaintiff to pay $500.00 to the
Clerk of this court as a Rule 11 sanction for filing this action.